ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTALITY POLICING ON POLRI PERFORMANCE IN GRESIK

Resa Fiardi MARASABESSY
Department of Criminology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia
Email corresponding author: resa.fiardi61@ui.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Public-sector performance measurement can increase organisational visibility while leaving dimensions of public trust unexamined. This study examines policing performance in Gresik, Indonesia, through an audit-governmentality perspective using institutional data from 2021-2023. The study combines descriptive validation with SWOT, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), and Strategic Factor Analysis Summary (SFAS) analysis. Public trust declined from 79% to 76%, while officer-related complaints increased from 5 to 16 and service satisfaction remained below its target. Reconstructed AHP matrices produced consistency ratios below the 0.10 threshold, supporting the internal consistency of the source judgments. SFAS identified continuous supervision, leadership commitment, competence development, external oversight, and violation reduction as key strategic factors. The findings indicate a metric-trust paradox: extensive organisational records do not necessarily make fairness, delay, unequal access, complaint resolution, or public experience visible. The study proposes participatory transparency through public indicator definitions, traceable complaint processes, equity-sensitive metrics, community review, protected error reporting, and independent validation.

Keywords: Audit Governmentality, Police Performance, Public Trust, Transparency, Community Empowerment.

1. INTRODUCTION

Trust can fall even while an organisation becomes more measurable. Gresik Police recorded performance targets, service indices, complaints, disciplinary cases, inter-agency coordination, rewards, sanctions, and digital-service initiatives. Yet the public-trust index declined by three percentage points between 2021 and 2023. The case is therefore not a simple absence of measurement. It is a question about what measurement makes visible, what it pushes off-stage, and how the resulting account travels back to citizens. This question fits the social-empowerment strand of community development. Police services structure everyday access to documents, case information, protection, mobility, and redress. Communities are weakened when transparency is reduced to institutional self-description, particularly when they cannot follow a complaint, challenge a classification, or see whether service improvements are equitably distributed. Conversely, public participation in the definition and review of performance can convert data from a managerial asset into civic infrastructure. The institutional source is Erika Purwana Putra's 2024 leadership paper on organisational performance assessment in Gresik Police, reproduced in the Sespim Polri Pokjar XX compilation (Putra, 2024) . It provides three-year aggregates and an AHP-weighted SWOT-SFAS exercise. The present article does not treat those figures as a representative citizen survey or a causal evaluation. It uses them as a bounded case of how police performance is rendered auditable. The research question is: how does an audit-governmentality lens explain the coexistence of dense organisational metrics and declining public trust in Gresik, and which AHP-SFAS priorities could open performance assessment to meaningful public scrutiny? The contribution is threefold. First, it places a local Indonesian police-performance case within poststructural criminology. Second, it tests the internal consistency of the source's AHP judgments rather than reproducing weights uncritically. Third, it translates the diagnosis into a community-centred transparency programme with explicit safeguards against metric gaming and discriminatory classification.

Foucault's notion of governmentality directs attention to the rationalities and techniques through which conduct is shaped at a distance (Foucault, 1991). Targets, rankings, self-assessments, disciplinary files, and dashboards do more than describe police work: they establish what deserves attention, which deviations require correction, and who must explain themselves. Power's audit society similarly shows how verification can become an organisational ritual, generating auditable traces that are not identical to substantive quality (Power, 1997). Shore & Wright (2015) extend this argument by showing how rankings and indicators assemble new regimes of comparison and self-discipline.
Quantification creates commensurability. Different encounters are converted into common units so that they can be compared across years, units, or personnel Espeland & Stevens (2008) . This capacity is useful, but never innocent: classifications determine which experiences enter the count. A complaint logged under the wrong category, a delayed

response closed administratively, or a respectful but unresolved interaction can disappear inside an aggregate. Metric fixation arises when the proxy begins to displace the purpose it was meant to serve (Muller, 2018). In policing, data infrastructures may also extend surveillance and organisational control without distributing equivalent visibility to the public (Brayne, 2017; Haggerty, 2025).

Transparency is not guaranteed to produce trust. Experimental and review evidence indicates that its effect depends on prior knowledge, the content disclosed, and the conditions under which people interpret it (Cucciniello et al., 2017; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2014). A recent meta-analysis finds a small positive average association, but also substantial contextual variation (Wang & Guan, 2023). For police, legitimacy is especially sensitive to respectful treatment, neutrality, voice, and trustworthy motives. Procedural justice is used here as a supporting mechanism, not the main theory: it explains why an efficient output count may fail to repair a citizen's experience of exclusion or unfairness (Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler, 2006).

Table 1. Operational dimensions of metric trust governmentality

Dimension	Empirical content	Analytical question
Visibility	Indicators, targets, dashboards, complaint categories	What can be counted, compared, and publicly followed?
Translation	Selection, coding, aggregation, ranking, exception rules	How does an encounter become an organisational fact?
Conduct	Supervision, incentives, sanctions, self-documentation	Which behaviours are rewarded, displaced, or concealed?
Counter-data	Citizen reports, oversight findings, testimony, local knowledge	Can the official account be challenged and corrected?
Recognition	Voice, neutrality, respect, equal access, supported redress	Whose experience counts as evidence of service quality?
Trust	Public confidence, cooperation, willingness to report	Does disclosure become credible institutional learning?

The framework in Figure 1 therefore treats trust as an outcome of a contested audit relation. Institutional records, digital systems, service encounters, and public counter-data are translated through selection, classification, target setting, and disclosure. The translation may generate visible performance, but it can also leave delay, unequal access, discrimination, or informal payments outside the field of view. Public participation matters because it introduces counter-data: complaints, testimony, questions, and local knowledge capable of testing the official account.

2. METHOD

Design, sources, and data boundaries

The study uses a theory-guided secondary case design. The primary source is the Gresik organisational-performance paper in the May 2024 Sespim Polri compilation (Putra, 2024). Data were transcribed from its tables and checked against the rendered source pages. The unit of analysis is the performance-assessment arrangement, not individual officers or complainants. No names, case narratives, or personal identifiers were used. The descriptive layer distinguishes trust, service, professional, complaint, conduct, coordination, and staffing indicators. The study does not merge them into a synthetic trust score because their denominators and measurement instruments are not reported consistently. Directional comparisons are therefore presented as planning signals. An association across three annual observations cannot establish that one indicator caused another.

SWOT, AHP, and SFAS reconstruction

The source identifies five opportunities, five threats, five strengths, and five weaknesses, then supplies pairwise AHP judgments and strategic ratings. Each matrix was reconstructed numerically. Priority vectors were obtained from the principal eigenvector. Consistency was assessed as CI = (lambda_max - n)/(n - 1) and CR = CI/RI, using RI = 1.12 for n = 5 (Saaty, 1980, 2008). A CR below 0.10 was treated as acceptable. Source weights allocate 0.50 to each positive and negative factor group; local priorities therefore equal the reported global weight divided by 0.50.

Table 2. Reconstructed AHP consistency diagnostics

Matrix	n	lambda_max	CR	Decision
Opportunities	5	5.0436	0.0097	Acceptable
Threats	5	5.2215	0.0494	Acceptable
Strengths	5	5.0486	0.0108	Acceptable
Weaknesses	5	5.2962	0.0661	Acceptable

SFAS retains ten portfolio factors and combines weight with the source's eight-point strategic rating. The ratings are ordinal planning judgments, not observed probabilities or causal effects. Strategies were interpreted through the theoretical framework and screened against three criteria: public visibility, protection against gaming, and the capacity for review. The stigmatising source phrase that attributed a culture of corruption to the public was not accepted as a social fact; it was reframed as exposure to informal-payment or bribery risk across the service relationship.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The metric-trust paradox

The public-trust index moved from 79% in 2021 to 78% in 2022 and 76% in 2023. Over the same period, officer-related complaints rose from 5 to 8 and then 16, while total administrative complaints fell from 17 to 9. This divergence is analytically important. A falling total can coexist with a rising subset because complaint categories, channels, and dispositions organise different realities. Treating either line as the definitive public voice would be misleading.

Two internal performance series also moved away from their targets. Reported professionalism was 83.79% in 2023 against an 88% target; service satisfaction was 82.94% against a 97.35% target. Discipline cases increased from 10 to 12 and ethics cases from 3 to 9. Meanwhile, inter-agency coordination activities fell from 274 in 2022 to 197 in 2023. These figures do not prove institutional decline, because rising complaints or disciplinary cases can reflect improved detection. They do show that a narrative of performance improvement cannot rest on activity counts alone.

Table 3. Selected Gresik indicators, 2021-2023

Indicator	Unit	2021	2022	2023	2021-23
Public trust index	%	79	78	76	-3 pp
Total administrative complaints	cases	17	16	9	-47.1%
Officer-related complaints	cases	5	8	16	+220.0%
Discipline cases	cases	10	10	12	+20.0%
Ethics cases	cases	3	6	9	+200.0%
Professionalism: actual	%	86.70	83.33	83.79	-2.91 pp
Professionalism: target	%	88	91	88	0 pp
Service satisfaction: actual	%	83.79	83.36	82.94	-0.85 pp
Service satisfaction: target	%	95.98	94.58	97.35	+1.37 pp
Inter-agency coordination	activities	220	274	197	-10.5%

Note: Values are reproduced from secondary institutional tables. Percentage-point (pp) change is distinguished from percentage change. Source: reconstructed from Putra (2024).



Figure 2. Selected organisational and public-service trends

Source: Authors' visualization from Putra (2024). Comparator lines are targets, except in Panel B where they show total complaints.

When an audit becomes the performance

The gap between a 97.35% satisfaction target and an 82.94% result illustrates how target escalation can intensify audit pressure without identifying the service mechanism that needs repair. If evaluation rewards closure, speed, or document completeness, staff may rationally optimise those traces. The citizen may still experience opacity, repeated referrals, or an unexplained delay. Audit governmentality predicts this displacement: people learn to perform the indicator because it is the indicator that travels upward.

The staffing table sharpens the point. A planned complement of 1,657 against an actual 808 leaves a gap of 849 positions. Shortage matters, but it does not explain which services are most exposed, which shifts or competencies are

missing, or whether digitalisation moves work rather than removes it. Similarly, 39 rewards and 21 sanctions in 2023 say little about the behaviours being incentivised. A trust-oriented system would connect personnel, workload, service stage, complaint, remedy, and user experience while protecting workers from crude league tables. The case also warns against equating transparency with publication. Research on public-sector transparency finds that disclosure can increase, decrease, or leave trust unchanged depending on what is revealed and how people can use it. Publishing a polished dashboard without definitions, denominators, corrections, or complaint outcomes may intensify scepticism. The relevant standard is answerability: can a resident understand the record, question it, receive a reasoned response, and see whether the organisation learned?

AHP-weighted SWOT and strategic portfolio

Table 4. EFAS reconstruction for Gresik

Type	External factor	Weight	Rating	Score
O	External oversight support	0.106	8	0.848
O	Public demand for better service	0.096	8	0.768
O	Technology development	0.106	7	0.742
O	Communication with IT expertise	0.089	7	0.623
O	Local-government support	0.103	7	0.721
T	Direct and online complaints	0.109	2	0.218
T	Negative public opinion	0.100	4	0.400
T	Negative social-media coverage	0.072	3	0.216
T	Weak public service awareness	0.094	4	0.376
T	Informal-payment / bribery exposure	0.125	3	0.375

Opportunity subtotal = 3.702; threat subtotal = 1.585; total = 5.287. The final threat label is an ethical reframing of a stigmatising source category.

Table 5. IFAS reconstruction for Gresik

Type	Internal factor	Weight	Rating	Score
S	Consistent reward and sanction	0.100	6	0.600
S	Assessment centre	0.098	8	0.784
S	Leadership supervision	0.105	7	0.735
S	Leadership commitment	0.100	7	0.700
S	Human-resource development function	0.097	7	0.679
W	Responsiveness and fairness gaps	0.096	3	0.288
W	Competence below standard	0.110	3	0.330
W	Personnel violations	0.109	2	0.218
W	Discriminatory conduct	0.099	4	0.396
W	Weak work coordination	0.085	3	0.255

Strength subtotal = 3.498; weakness subtotal = 1.487; total = 4.985. Ratings are source planning judgments on an eight-point scale.



Figure 3. SFAS portfolio weights and source-weighted scores

Source: Authors' visualization from the AHP-SFAS annex in Putra (2024). Weights sum to 0.999 because of rounding.

Table 6. SFAS strategy translated into public-facing interventions

SFAS factor	Weight	Rating	Score	Horizon	Audit-governmentality intervention

Continuous supervision	0.133	7	0.931	Short	Use case-stage review plus protected error reporting; audit fairness, not only closure.
Leadership commitment	0.129	7	0.903	Short	Publish definitions, exceptions, corrections, and reasons for missed targets.
Competence development	0.126	3	0.378	Medium	Train service, data, anti-discrimination, explanation, and digital case-handling skills.
External oversight	0.108	8	0.864	Short	Jointly validate samples of complaints, delays, and remedies with independent actors.
Violation reduction	0.104	2	0.208	Medium	Connect discipline learning to service redesign while protecting due process.
Digital administration	0.096	7	0.672	Medium	Build traceable case journeys with access controls, feedback, and correction logs.
Reward and sanction	0.080	6	0.480	Medium	Reward verified learning and equitable service; screen for gaming effects.
Local-government support	0.080	7	0.560	Medium	Integrate referrals and public-service pathways without duplicating data.
Complaint reduction	0.072	2	0.144	Long	Replace the reduction target with resolution quality, access, and non-retaliation.
Informal-payment risk	0.071	3	0.213	Long	Redesign high-discretion points; publish fees and enable confidential reporting.

From transparency to social empowerment

The highest priorities are not calls for more publicity. They are opportunities to change the architecture of answerability. Continuous supervision should follow a small sample of service journeys from first contact to remedy and ask where voice, fairness, or explanation was lost. Leadership commitment should be visible in definitions and corrections, not only ceremonial targets. Competence development should include data ethics and discrimination because a cleaner dashboard can still encode an unjust service process. A community metric panel can provide disciplined counter-data. Its members would include service users, neighbourhood representatives, disability advocates, women's groups, legal-aid actors, local government, external oversight, and frontline staff. The panel should not receive personal case files. It should review anonymised journey data, missed-service patterns, unresolved categories, reasons for delay, accessibility, and the organisation's response. This design treats communities as co-authors of evaluative standards rather than passive recipients of information.

Table 7. Community-empowerment implementation scorecard

Mechanism	Action	Evidence of progress
Indicator dictionary	Publish definition, denominator, owner, update cycle, exceptions, and correction history.	100% of public indicators documented; correction log visible.
Complaint journey	Issue a non-identifying tracking code and explain each transition, delay, and outcome.	Acknowledgment time; unresolved-age profile; reason quality; appeal access.
Equity review	Disaggregate service access by channel, location, time, and accessibility need without profiling individuals.	Access gaps; repeated referrals; disability and language accommodation.
Protected learning	Separate good-faith error reporting from misconduct adjudication while retaining accountability.	Near-miss reports; corrective actions; repeat-process failures.
Independent validation	Audit samples of published claims, complaint dispositions, and service journeys.	Validation exceptions closed; public summary issued each quarter.
Community review	Give a plural panel authority to question definitions and request reasoned revisions.	Recommendations accepted, rejected with reasons, or implemented.

4. CONCLUSION

The Gresik case is not characterised by a lack of performance data. It is characterised by a misalignment between what is readily auditable and what people need to recognise a service as fair, responsive, and correctable. Trust fell from 79% to 76%; officer-related complaints rose; service satisfaction remained well below its target; and conduct indicators moved in an adverse direction. The series are too short and heterogeneous for causal claims, but their divergence is sufficient to reject a simple equation between more metrics and more trust. Audit governmentality provides the appropriate poststructural criminological lens because it explains how performance categories actively organise conduct and visibility. AHP diagnostics confirm that the source judgments are internally consistent, while SFAS identifies continuous supervision, leadership commitment, competence, external oversight, and violation reduction as the core portfolio. The necessary shift is from ritual verification to participatory verification: public definitions, traceable journeys, protected learning, equity review, independent validation, and a structured place for

counter-data. In that arrangement, transparency becomes a community capacity to question and revise institutional performance.

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